ABSTRACT Smart home systems can provide health care services for people with special needs in their own homes. Briefly defined, such a smart home has special electronics to enable the remote control of automated devices specifically designed for remote health care to ensure the safety of the patient at home and the supervision of their health status. These sensors are linked to a local intelligence unit responsible for analyzing sensor data, detecting emergency situations, and interfacing between the patient at home and a set of people involved in their health care, such as doctors, nurses, emergency services, and paramedics. Smart homes can improve the patient's quality of life and safety through the innovative use of advanced technologies. Telemedicine and telecare are driving forces behind the adoption of smart homes. The telecare medicine information system (TMIS) has drawn worldwide attention for the past 20 years, as modern technologies have made remote delivery of healthcare a reality. TMIS using multidisciplinary research and application involves advanced technologies in information processing, telecommunications, bio-sensing, and artificial intelligence including smart technologies. TMIS leverages the latest mobile and wireless communication technologies and widely available internet infrastructure to deliver quality services to home patients enabling them to remotely access information about their health and obtain telemedical services. TMIS delivers capabilities to remotely provide 24 × 7 health care facilities to patients. Its purpose is to provide patients with convenient and expedited remote health care services, greatly improving the quality and efficiency of health care services. However, the open and insecure nature of the internet poses a number of security threats to patient secrecy and privacy. Security design for TMIS is not trivial. Essential security and privacy are provided by mutual authentication and key agreement protocols. This paper proposes an efficient and secure, bilinear pairing-based, unlink-able, mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for TMIS. The proposed protocol adopts a fuzzy extractor for the identification of patients using the biometric data. The security of the proposed protocol is based on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman problem (ECCDHP) to preserve the privacy of the user. The detailed security analysis is discussed, and the results of comparison are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of smart homes in a smart city emerged from a combination of three research areas: medicine, domotics (home-based automation and remote-controlled devices) and information systems. Smart homes are one of the most promising ways to develop patient-centered telemedicine and telecare services. The smart room concept developed earlier in the domains of domotics [2] , [3] , robotics and artificial intelligence [4] was later extended to the fields of telemedicine and telecare.
Recent advances in networking and wireless technologies and the growing prevalence of smart devices along with access to social networks and cloud computing have significantly changed all spheres of life. The medical field is no exception. Such technologies are rapidly gaining popularity in the medical sector to improve and facilitate the delivery of health care services. The telecare medicine information system (TMIS) is an important example of a rapidly growing medical service. TMIS provides various health-care facilities and treatments to patients via the internet, enabling patients to remotely access information about their health and obtain tele-medical services. TMIS delivers capabilities to remotely provide 24 × 7 health care facilities to patients [16] , [31] , [40] greatly improving the quality and efficiency of health care services. However, the open and insecure nature of the internet poses various security threats to patient secrecy and privacy.
Essential security and privacy in an open network are provided by mutual authentication and key agreement protocols. Mutual authentication protocols ensure that only authorized entities have access to health data. Key agreement protocols ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the information in transit. Furthermore, given frequent identity attacks, such as identity stealing and tracing, secure authentication and key agreement protocols are desirable to protect the security, integrity and authenticity of patient records. Therefore, it is necessary to design an anonymous and unlink-able mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for TMIS. Initially, two-factor authentication schemes received much attention with numerous schemes proposed. Several weaknesses of two-factor schemes have been identified; passwords are easy to break through simple dictionary attacks and smart cards can be misappropriated and are also subject to differential power attacks. Consequently, biometric-based user authentications protocols have been introduced and are considered better and more reliable alternatives than traditional passwordbased authentication schemes. Biometric methods are unique and quantifiable methods for recognizing a human being. Biometric information is prone to various noise during data acquisition and the reproduction of actual biometric data is hard in common practice. To avoid these problems a fuzzy extractor [19] is used, Fuzzy extractors generate strong keys
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• The generation process (Gen)is a probabilistic production process that takes as input the users biometric information Bio and gives as output a secret value O i and a random ancillary parameter par i .
• The reproduction process (Rep)is a deterministic production process that takes as input the users biometric information Bio and the corresponding random ancillary parameter par i and gives a secret value O i as the output. A number of biometric-based mutual authentication and key agreement protocols for TMIS have been proposed but they have either been proven insecure against various attacks or offer security solutions involving modular exponentiation. To this end bilinear pairing can be put forward as an efficient and secure mechanism for a mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for TMIS.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper proposes an efficient and secure bilinear pairingbased, unlink-able, mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for TMIS. The proposed protocol adopts a fuzzy extractor for the identification of patient's using biometric data. Further, the security of the proposed protocol is based on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve computational Diffie Hellman problem (ECCDHP). Our major contributions are as follows:
• a mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for TMIS;
• computational costs distributed between the TMIS server and the patient to lower computation requirements;
• using the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve computational Diffie Hellman problem (ECCDHP) to provide security against known attacks;
• formally analyzing the security of the proposed scheme using the real-or-random (R-OR) model;
• comparing the proposed protocol favorably to other related and existing protocols in terms of the communication and computational costs across the various phases; and
• demonstrating the higher security and efficiency of the proposed protocol compared to other related and existing schemes which make it more appropriate for practical applications. Organization of the Paper: The next section describes a TMIS architecture and its benefits in the medical field. Section IV briefly reviews the existing protocols for TMIS, and Section V describes preliminaries to enable better understanding of the proposed protocol. The proposed protocol is detailed in Section VI. A formal security analysis of the proposed protocol using the random oracle model is presented in Section VII and Section VIII further analyzes the security of the proposed protocol, while Section IX analyzes its performance compared to other existing protocols. Finally, Section X concludes. Figure 1 depicts a typical TMIS architecture. TMIS provides communication platform to different parties i.e. the physician, patient, laboratory and medical server. They are connected with each other and are willing to share information related to patient's treatments, medications and test results over an internet. Whenever a patient needs health care services, he/she needs to log into the medical server. On getting a request from a patient, the medical server first verifies the legitimacy of the patient. If the patient is legitimate, then the medical server contacts the physicians to provide health care consultation to the patient. To access these health care services remotely, a user is first required to register with the TMIS server. The server registers patients and acts as an interface between patients and physicians.
III. A TMIS ARCHITECTURE AND ITS BENEFITS IN THE MEDICAL FIELD
As TMIS is provided over the internet, the internets open structure renders a number of security threats. As shown in Figure 1 , an adversary can acquire confidential patient information by apprehending messages exchanged between a patient and the medical server. The adversary can also alter messages exchanged between patient and physician. This breaches the privacy of the patient and can also result in irreparable injury. Hence, a secure mechanism for authentication and key agreement should be employed to restrict unauthorized accesses to medical information stored on the medical servers and exchanged between users (physicians and patients) and medical servers. Some of the important benefits of TMIS include the following:
• It provides remote health and medical services.
• It improves patients quality of life.
• It provides accurate diagnosis and treatment to patients, as all medical records are stored on the TMIS server.
• It saves human labor, time and money.
A. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF TMIS
TMIS should meet the following essential security criteria:
• It should provide an efficient and secure mutual authentication and key agreement protocol to enable secure communication over an insecure network.
• The mutual authentication and key agreement protocol should provide patients with anonymity and unlink-ability.
• Session key authentication should be used to prevent various possible attacks such as key impersonation and privileged-insider.
• Due to limited resources such as battery, memory, communications bandwidth and computational capabilities, the computational and communication costs of the TMIS should be kept low.
IV. RELATED WORK
This section briefly reviews existing protocols proposed for TMIS. Numerous password-based and biometric-based authentication and key agreement schemes have been proposed but all are either prone to different attacks or do not provide desirable features like user anonymity and privacy. In 2012, Chen et al. [17] proposed a dynamic ID-based authentication scheme for TMIS which protects user anonymity. Cao and Zhai [18] , Lin [32] , and Xie et al. [47] demonstrated the weaknesses of the Chen et al. protocol and presenting independent improved protocols for TMIS. Later, their protocols were shown to lack the inputverifying condition, which leads to denial of service; if an authorized user mistakenly enters incorrect input in the password change phase the user can never again use the smart card to login to the server. Wu et al. [42] also proposed an authentication protocol for TMIS, but Debiao et al. [20] demonstrated that this protocol is prone to various attacks. He et al. then proposed a new protocol to prevent the identified attacks. Later, Wei et al. [43] showed that the He et al. protocol is also insecure against password guessing attacks and proposed a new protocol. Zhu [48] showed that the Wei et al. protocol is insecure and Jiang et al. [28] soon showed that even the Zhu et al. protocol is insecure.
Over the years several weaknesses of two-factor schemes have been identified, as passwords are easy to break by simple dictionary attacks. Similarly, smart cards can be misappropriated and are also subject to differential power attack. Consequently, biometric-based user authentication protocols have been introduced and are considered better and more reliable alternatives than traditional password-based authentication schemes. Abundant biometric-based protocols have been presented. In 2013, Awasthi and Srivastava [6] proposed a biometric authentication scheme for TMIS. Over the subsequent years Mishra et al. [36] and [41] demonstrated that the Awasthi et al. protocol suffers from many drawbacks; offline password guessing and reflection attacks and an inappropriate password changing phase. Therefore, Tan et al. proposed an enhanced three-factor authentication scheme which was later proven prone to replay and denial of service attacks by Arshad and Nikooghadam [7] . Later, Lu et al. [34] proved the Arshad and Nikooghadam protocol insecure against off-line password guessing and patient impersonation attacks. They presented a new protocol but the Lu et al. protocol is also vulnerable to numerous attacks, such as the patient anonymity violation attack, patient impersonation attack, and the TMIS server impersonation attack, and the protocol does not provide patient untrace-ability. Table 1 comprehensively overviews work on the telecare medical information system (TMIS).
V. PRELIMINARIES
The present section elaborates the notation table and briefly discusses fundamental concepts relating to an elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) and bilinear pairing.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM (ECC)
An elliptic curve cryptosystem [25] involves the equation curve such that 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0(modp). The curve is defined as E p = {{(x, y)} : E p (x, y) = 0 ∪ {0}}, where {0} is the point at infinity is considered an identity element. Below, we define the following two hard computational problems pertaining to ECC security:
1) The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) can be defined as follows: given two points P and Q over an elliptic curve E p (a, b) it is computationally hard to find an integer x such that P = xQ in polynomial time.
2) The Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie Hellman
Problem (ECCDHP) can be defined as follows: given three points Q, aQ and bQ over an elliptic curve E p (a, b) it is computationally hard to find abQ in polynomial time.
B. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 , + be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a large prime p and let G 2 , . be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order p. A bilinear pairing e is a map defined by e : G 1 × G 2 → G 2 with the following properties. 1) Bilinear: For given (P, Q) ∈ G 1 , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for any a, b ∈ Z p * . 2) Non-degenerate: There exists (P, Q) ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1, where 1 is the identity of G 2 . 3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all (P, Q) ∈ G 1 . The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard in both G 1 and G 2 . Weil pairing, modified Weil pairing and Tate pairing are all cryptographically secure pairings.
VI. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents a new biometric-based, anonymous and unlink-able mutual authentication and key agreement phase for TMIS using bilinear pairing. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the hardness of the ECDLP and ECCDH problems. The proposed scheme has three phases: (1) initialization; (2) registration; (3) login, authentication, and key agreement; and (4) password changing. For clarity, the notations in Table 2 are used throughout the paper. 1) Initialization: TMIS server S sets up its parameters. S chooses the public parameters {q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P, h, H } generates its master private key MPK = s ∈ Z * q computes its master public key as P pub = sP and publishes the system parameters as Param = {q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P, h, H , P pub }. The registration and login, authentication and key agreement phases are depicted in Table 3 , whereas the password changing phase in depicted in Table 4 .
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS USING RANDOM ORACLE MODEL
This section formally analyzes the security of the proposed scheme using the real-or-random (R-OR) model given by Abdalla et al. [5] , which assimilates the Bellare and Rogaway [10] - [12] model for key distribution and the Bellare et al. [13] model for password-based authenticated key exchange. We briefly describe the R-OR model details can be found in [5] . The scheme involves two participants, a user U i and a TMIS server S.
• Instance: denote the instance t of S and instance u of U i . These instances are called oracles.
• SID: The SID (session identifier) of any oracle is defined as the concatenation of all the message sent and received by that oracle.
• Open Oracle: If an oracle t S reveals the accepted session key in any state then oracle is considered opened in that state.
• Partner Oracle: Two oracles • Fresh Oracle: An oracle t S is unfresh if it is opened or its partner oracle t S is opened or corrupted; otherwise, it is fresh oracle.
• Adversary: In the R-OR model, the adversary A has the ability to control all communications and can make the following queries: 
The semantic security of the session key SK is modeled by this query and follows the R-OR model's indistinguishability [5] . A can make a test query to any fresh oracle at any time. At the beginning of the experiment a fair unbiased coin c is flipped. If answer is 1 the output is a randomly chosen session key. Otherwise, the output is the agreed session key of the test oracle.
• Semantic security of the session key: In the R-OR model, adversary A challenges the experiment to distinguish between the real session key SK of the instance and the random session key. A can execute a number of Test queries to either the user instance or the server instance. The result of the Test query must be consistent with respect to random bit c. At the end of the experiment, A returns a bit c . If c = c, A wins the game. Let Succ denote the event that A wins the game. The advantage of A in breaking the semantic security of the protocol is Adv ake P = 2|Pr[Succ] − 1|. Therefore, if Adv ake P ≤ η, for any sufficiently small η > 0, P is a secure authentication protocol in the R-OR sense.
• Random oracle: In this paper, all participants and the adversary A use a one-way hash function h(.) modeled as a Hash oracle. The following difference lemma will be used in the formal security proof.
Lemma 1 (Difference Lemma): [33] : Let Succ 1 , Succ 2 and Succ 3 denote the events defined in some probability distribution. Let Succ 1 ∧ Succ 3 ⇐⇒?Succ 2 ∧?Succ 3 . Then, we have
The following theorem will establish the semantic security of the session key.
Theorem 2: Assume that adversary A is operating within polynomial time t for the proposed protocol P in a random oracle. Assume D represents uniformly distributed password dictionary and l denotes bit size of the biometrics key O i . The probability of that the security of the session key of P is broken by A is as follows:
where q h , |HASH |, q send , |D|, andAdv ECCDHP (t) denote the number of Hash queries, the range space of the one-way hash function, the number of Send queries, the size of D, and the advantage of A in breaking the ECCDHP, respectively.
Proof 3:
We define a sequence of games G i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 4. Let Succ i denote success of A in guessing the bit c in the game G i . The proposed protocol runs from game G 0 to game G 4 and the conclusion of the proof will show that A has a negligible advantage to break session key (SK )-security of P.
• Game G 0 : This game is a real attack by the adversary against protocol P in the random oracle. The bit c is chosen at the beginning of this game. By definition, we have:
• Game G 1 : This game simulates an eavesdropping attack of an adversary A using the Execute ( t , u ) oracle. The attacker also queries the Test oracle and checks whether the result is a real session key SK or some other random value. The session key SK is computed by the server S and user U i as SK = h(T i ||R i ||T s ||R s ||L s ); the timestamp introduces freshness to the session key. It is hard to compute L s = r i r s P due to the hardness of the ECCDH problem. Further, R i , R s cannot be computed due to the hardness of the ECDLP. Thus, the probability of adversary A winning this game through an eavesdropping attack does not increase. Then, G 0 and G 1 have the same probability, so we obtain:
This game is an extension of G 1 , G 2 is simulated by Send and Hash oracles and Execute ( t , u ) and Test oracles. An active attack is modeled by adversary A sending fabricated messages to deceive the participants, and A repeatedly generates hash queries to obtain collisions. The login request LR i = {R i , T i , Auth i } and the mutual authentication message MA = (R s , T s , Auth s ) are associated with random numbers r i andr s and time stamps t i andt s . Therefore, the messages are guaranteed to be random and hence no collision will be obtained in querying the Send oracle. Using the birthday paradox [14] we obtain,
The CorruptSC oracle is simulated by this game and a lost smart card attack is launched. Adversary A can attempt a dictionary attack using the information from a smart card attempting to obtain password PW i and biometric key O i . A strong fuzzy extractor is used in the suggested protocol. Therefore, the probability that A can guess the biometric key O i is approximately 1 2 l [45] . Since the system controls the number of wrong password inputs, we obtain the following:
• Game G 4 :In this game, adversary A tries to acquire session key SK through eavesdropping on the login request LR i = {R i , T i , Auth i } and the mutual authentication message MA = (R s , T s , Auth s ). As mentioned for G 1 , it is hard to compute L s = r i r s P due to the hardness of the ECCDH problem. Further, r i , r s cannot be computed from the values R i , R s due to the hardness of the ECDLP. Thus, we obtain, All session keys are random and independent and the c value is not exposed to Adversary A. Therefore, it is clear that
Combining the above equations and Lemma 1, we obtain the desired result as follows:
VIII. FURTHER SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section proves that the proposed protocol not only withstands various attacks but also satisfies the basic security requirement mentioned in prior studies.
A. PROVIDES PATIENT ANONYMITY
Patient anonymity means that nobody can obtain the real identity ID i of any patient except the TMIS server. In the proposed protocol ID i is concealed in
To get ID i the adversary has to compute K i = e(P pub , r i Q s ). Without knowledge of r i the adversary is unable to compute K i with P p ub and Q s in polynomial time. Therefore, the adversary cannot obtain the identity of any patient. That is, the proposed protocol provides patient anonymity.
B. PROVIDES PATIENT UNLINK-ABILITY
Patient unlink-ability means any adversary is unable to link two past authentication sessions by the same user. 
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed protocol compared with the protocols of Amin and Biswas [8] , Giri et al. [24] , and Irshad et al. [27] with respect to computational cost during registration, login authentication and key agreement and password changing. Generally, computation cost is examined based on the respective operations in the various phases of the protocol. Table 5 defines various computational complexities and their conversions in terms of T ML as given in [26] . Table 6 summarizes the computation overhead of the proposed protocol and other relevant protocols [8] , [24] and [27] . Table 7 also gives a comparative security analysis. Thus, from Tables 6 and 7 , we conclude that the proposed protocol is more efficient and secure than existing protocols. 
X. CONCLUSION
Remote health care for patients has drawn interest from researchers and industry. Remote health care includes services such as remote diagnosis, advice, treatment and assistance implemented mainly using information and communication technologies. As Tang and Venables [1] pointed out, smart homes and telecare are natural companions: smart homes make it possible to provide effective telecare services. The proliferation of telecare medical information system (TMIS) are consistently leading to the development of smart homes. Hence, in this paper, we proposed an efficient and secure, bilinear pairing based, mutual authentication and key agreement protocol for TMIS. The security of the proposed protocol is formally analyzed using the real-or-random (R-OR) model under the assumption of the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve computational Diffie Hellman problem (ECCDHP). Further, the protocol is resilient to all known attacks. In terms of computational costs during the various phases, the proposed protocol is also comparable to existing, related protocols. Computing (CPMC), CCIS, KSU, successfully managing its research program, which transformed the chair as one of the best chairs of research excellence in the college. His research interests include multimedia-assisted health systems, ambient intelligence, serviceoriented architecture, multimedia cloud, sensor cloud, the Internet of Things, big data, mobile cloud, social networks, and recommender systems. VOLUME 7, 2019 
